



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4 August 1965



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


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

JCS, DIA and State
Dept. review(s)
completed.

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4 August 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS


1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
2. Congo: Radical Brazzaville regime moving further left. (Page 4)
3. Greece: Athanasiadis-Novas has almost no chance of winning vote of confidence. (Page 5)
4.
5. Notes: Dominican Republic;
Egypt - Saudi Arabia; United Nations. (Page 7)

25X1

25X1

25X1

NORTH VIETNAM



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 Aug 1965

*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

US Air Strikes: On 3 August US Navy aircraft struck two primary targets in North Vietnam. The Nam Dinh thermal power plant was reportedly 100 percent destroyed, and at the Bai Thuong barracks area six buildings reportedly were destroyed and three heavily damaged.

Twenty-two US Navy armed reconnaissance sorties were flown, inflicting moderate damage to a bridge, a ferry, a supply depot, and several roads. US Air Force planes on reconnaissance missions report dropping a span on the Thanh Neia railroad bridge near Vinh.


One Air Force F-105 was downed by ground fire and the pilot was not recovered. This brings to 72 the total number of US aircraft lost over North Vietnam since last August.

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Communist Political Developments: Hanoi's continued strong propaganda reaction to the announcement of an increase in US troop strength in South Vietnam has not yet been accompanied by specific threats of counteraction. In response the North Vietnamese continue to speak confidently of ultimate military victory and refuse to alter their stated position on negotiations.

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Although still defiant, however, Hanoi may also be apprehensive over the nature of new US initiatives. The ICC protest over the troop increases--usually a routine complaint signed by a North Vietnamese colonel in the ICC liaison office--was published this time over the signature of General Giap, the head of the North Vietnamese Army. The US action also prompted a formal government protest statement, which used the US commitment to justify a strong plea for increased bloc "assistance and support in all fields."

The first authoritative Chinese Communist response to President Johnson's 28 July news conference was a Peiping editorial on 3 August that adopts the same defiant position that Hanoi has been taking. The editorial includes a detailed comparison of the situation to the Korean War which is designed to show that the outlook now is much more gloomy for the US than it was 15 years ago. While this declaration of faith in victory probably reflects genuine Chinese confidence, it is probably intended primarily to bolster the morale of any--including the North Vietnamese--who have been shaken by the announcement of new US troop commitments.

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: A Viet Cong attack on the Duc Co special forces camp, in northwestern Pleiku Province, was repulsed yesterday by the 400-man paramilitary garrison and its 12 US advisors. Approximately two battalions of Vietnamese airborne troops were airlifted to the area yesterday, but did not have to be committed to the action. Duc Co is one of two outposts located along Route 19 between the Cambodian border and the provincial capital of Pleiku.

According to press reports, Viet Cong attacks yesterday on two government installations located near the capital of Phuoc Long Province and the district capital of Thanh Phu in Kien Hoa Province were turned back by timely tactical air strikes. Government casualties were reportedly light in both instances.

(continued)

Four American personnel were wounded on 2 August during a 20-minute Viet Cong mortar bombardment of the US Army helicopter base at Soc Trang, in Ba Xuyen Province. All aircraft, however, were safely evacuated.

The Political Situation in South Vietnam: Uncertainty continues to characterize discussions between the Vietnamese government and the tribal autonomy movement FULRO, despite continuing government receptivity to a reconciliation. During a week end meeting with FULRO representatives, ranking Vietnamese military and government officials generally agreed to support the particular needs of the tribes, and, for the first time, dangled the possibility of a future autonomous status for them.

Just prior to the meeting, however, a large number of armed tribesmen from a government paramilitary camp joined forces with a nearby FULRO unit. Moreover, the FULRO representative at the meeting requested that the government provide a quantity of rice before he would agree to pass the government's proposals to other FULRO leaders. This sequence of events has led at least some Vietnamese officials to suspect that FULRO's approach may be a maneuver to obtain rice, if not arms, for the Viet Cong in the highlands.

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Congo: The radical Brazzaville regime appears to be moving even further to the left.

There is as yet no evidence that the generally disorganized extremists are ready to take complete control, but recent events point to a continuing weakening of the relatively moderate elements. Prime Minister Lissouba, a Marxist but considered moderate in the Brazzaville context, now appears to be losing ground. Observers in Brazzaville anticipate dramatic developments soon, perhaps during the 13-15 August anniversary celebration of the ouster of ex-President Youlou.

The ascendancy of the new, extremist-controlled "popular militia" over the regular security forces has strengthened the leftists' position. The militia is credited with the destruction of the "commando operation" attempted last month by Youlou's Leopoldville-based supporters. Recently it has assumed several functions of the army, which appears to be in considerable disarray following the arrest of at least seven high-level officers this summer. On 29 July the National Assembly president called upon the militia to "exterminate all counterrevolutionaries."

Chinese Communist influence in Brazzaville seems likely to increase. Chinese advisers appear to have been instrumental in forming the militia and presumably retain an important behind-the-scenes role.

Meanwhile, new incidents involving the harassment of US officials by Congolese authorities suggest the Brazzaville government is willing to accept a further worsening of relations with the US.

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Greece: The Palace-sponsored government of Athanasiadis-Novas seems to have almost no chance of winning a vote of confidence, and the continuing political chaos is straining the Greek parliamentary system.

A parliamentary vote could come today, but the government's presentation of its case is likely to continue until Friday as the search goes on for a compromise candidate. According to Palace sources, the King is still planning to call on another member of the Center Union (CU) party, but not Papandreou, to form a government if Athanasiadis-Novas fails. Papandreou is personally boycotting the current session of Parliament, however, and is showing no sign of losing control of the CU or of backing away from his confrontation with the King.

Many Greek political leaders appear to be "gravely concerned" over the threat to the Greek parliamentary system posed by the intransigence of both sides in the dispute. Defense Minister Kostopoulos believes the impasse increases the possibility of a nonparliamentary government appointed by the King and based on military support. He views such an alternative, however, as ultimately disastrous to the stability of the country.

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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NOTES

Dominican Republic: [Armed extremists in the rebel zone plan to turn in only a token quantity of weapons once a settlement of the current impasse has been concluded.]

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[redacted] plans to turn in only 120 defective weapons, saving the remainder for the "bigger fight" which he said would begin in the near future. He was presumably referring to the "prolonged war" which hard-line extremist groups have been urging.]

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4 Aug 65

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Egypt - Saudi Arabia: [The Egyptians claim that last week end King Faysal told a Nasir envoy that he was willing to meet Nasir to discuss a Yemeni settlement, but could not set a date at that time. The Saudis, however, reported that the talks with the envoy had been disappointing. Meanwhile, Egyptian aircraft continued on 1 August to penetrate Saudi air space, and the Saudis have ordered military transport planes to stand by for immediate duty. Nasir threatened on 22 July to take military action against Saudi Arabia if a settlement is not reached soon.]

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United Nations: [The resumption of disarmament talks in Geneva and renewed consideration of UN involvement in Vietnam are again focusing the attention of some delegates on the Chinese representation problem. The Australian representative has commented that he is impressed by the weight of opinion among UN members favoring Chinese Communist representation on the grounds that it might facilitate solution of the Vietnam and disarmament problems as well as other issues.]

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4 Aug 65

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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